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ABSTRACT 
Firms possessing a dominant pos1t10n m a market create special 
problems in competition law. They may engage in competitive conduct, 
which benefits consumers, or anticompet1t1ve conduct, which 
benefitdsno one but itself. Distinguishing between the two types of 
conduct is difficult, · as one may look very much like the other. This 
paper explores the way in which the three jurisdictions distinguish 
between good and bad conduct by dominant firms. It looks, in 
particular, at a recent New Zealand case, and applies to its particular fact 
situation the laws of the United States and the European Community. 
The paper argues that New Zealand law has marked similarities with 
United States law. It further suggests that the New Zealand statutory 
provision which regulates the conduct of dominant firms, s 36 
Commerce Act 1986, should be amended in line with the established 
streams of the United States jurisprudence. This, it is argued, will ensure 
that the provision is more in tune with purpose of the Act as a whole. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, abstract, footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 13,550 words. 
Ill 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms possessing a dominant position in a market can act for good or for 
evil. They act for good when they engage in aggressive competitive 
conduct on the merits of their products, service, and price. This remains 
true even if their conduct harms competitors or eliminates rivals from 
the market place. If a dominant firm is more efficient, more industrious, 
or simply smarter than its smaller competitors it deserves the dominance 
it holds. Its behaviour in trading competitively can only benefit 
consumers. Conversely, dominant firms act for evil when they 
undertake exclusionary or predatory conduct. 1 This is not competition 
on the merits and is designed to drive competitors from the market or 
prevent their entry. In this case firms trade upon their market power not 
on their skill and industry. In doing so they risk eliminating more 
efficient or innovative firms from the market when ordinarily those 
firms would survive and flourish. This necessarily harms consumers. It is 
the task of competition laws to differentiate between the good and evil 
conduct of the monopolist. Unfortunately, this is a difficult endeavour, 
as conduct which is exclusionary or predatory may look very much like 
conduct which is aggressively competitive.2 Further, enforcement, if 
undertaken in a wrong or misguided manner, will reward the inefficient 
at the expense of the efficient. 
This paper examines the question of how should New Zealand law 
distinguish between a monopolist's competitive and anticompetitive 
conduct. It attempts to discover the best means of ensuring that conduct 
which is anticompetitive is met with appropriate censure while leaving 
competitive activity untouched. In other words, the laws controlling the 
2 
The term "exclusionary conduct" is commonly used to refer to conduct "which 
allow a firm to eliminate or injure rivals without regard to their efficiency." See 
John Andrew Maher, "Draining the Alcoa 'Wishing Well" : The Section 2 
Conduct Requirement After Kodak and Calcomp" (1979) 48 Fordham L Rev 291, 
at p 291 n 2. It is "strategic maneuvers that interfere with the normal competitive 
process and artificially deter entry or prevent existing rivals from increasing 
output." See Alon Y Kapan, "Duty to Cooperate Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act: Aspen Skiing's Slippery Slope" (1987) 72 Cornell L Rev 1047, at p 1049. 
There are essentially two sorts of exclusionary conduct: predatory pricing and 
raising rival's costs in ways that the dominant firm does not face . See also Frank 
H Easterbrook, "On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct" (1986) 61 Notre Dame L 
Rev 972, 974. 
Easterbrook, above, n 1, p 972 
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activities of dominant firms should ensure not only that those firms 
which do not compete on the merits are caught, but also that the 
innocently competitive firm is left to continue in its business without 
the need to defend itself against allegations of anticompetitive conduct. 
The law should be sufficiently clear and certain that firms possessing 
market power can act with reasonable certainty. Further, it should also 
provide clear signals to regulators and potential private litigators of their 
prospects of success should they wish to challenge a dominant firm's 
activities. The current case law mostly meets these requirements. 
However, the general approach required by the case law has been 
challenged. This paper argues that in order to provide a clear and 
consistent test for anticompetitive conduct undertaken by dominant 
firms there is a need for amendment to s 36(1) of the Commerce Act 
1986.3 
This paper begins from the premise that the aim of competition law in 
New Zealand is the promotion of competition in New Zealand markets. 
While this concept is similar to and often overlaps with the goal of 
economic efficiency, the promotion of competition is best seen as the 
primary means of achieving an efficient economy. The promotion of 
competition, it is argued, means the preservation and promotion of 
competitive processes rather than the protection of actual and existing 
competition or competitors. The Commerce Act works best when it 
focuses on the process of competition rather than the effects of particular 
activity on individual firms. Further, it works best when it focuses on 
the behaviour of dominant firms which is objectively anticompetitive. It 
should, as is currently the situation in the case law, look more to 
conduct than to purpose. Indeed, it is argued that the Act will work 
better if the purpose element of s 36(1) is completely discarded and a 
clear, consistent test for "use" of a dominant position is added to the Act. 
This argument is developed through a discussion of New Zealand's 
Commerce Act 1986 in comparison with the competition laws of the 
United States and the European Community. Accordingly, the essay 
falls into three major parts. Part 2 discusses the purpose of the 
Commerce Act 1986 and s 36(1) in particular. Part 3 narrows the focus 
of the paper by analysing a major decision under s 36, both in terms of 
3 1986 No 5, RS 31. Enacted 28 April 1986, in force from 1 May 1986. 
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the general approach taken by the Courts to the provision, and in terms 
of the particular conduct undertaken by the firm and the Courts' 
application of s 36 to this conduct. Part 4 then develops a comparison 
with the jurisprudence of the United States and the European 
Community. It discusses the general principles applied in each 
jurisdiction to the behaviour of monopoly firms and considers how the 
Courts in those jurisdictions have treated cases comparable to those 
analysed in the discussion of s 36. 
The paper concludes that New Zealand's approach to the conduct of 
dominant firms is very similar to that adopted by the United States' 
Courts, and that this approach is consistent with the objects of the 
Commerce Act. However, it is suggested that s 36 be amended to clarify 
two particular points. First, that the section should be concerned only 
with objective conduct. It is not necessary to examine the motivation or 
purpose of the dominant firm. The current requirement to examine the 
firm's purpose is confusing and unnecessary, and detracts from the 
primary purpose of the section. Secondly, the section should clearly and 
explicitly state the test that the Courts are to apply when determining 
whether a dominant firm has used its market power. 
2. SECTION 36 COMMERCE ACT 1986 -
GENERAL 
2.1. Historical Background 
Modern New Zealand trade practices legislation in the field began with 
the Trade Practices Act 1958.4 This legislation closely reflected the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 19 56 (UK). 5 The Trade Practices Act 
concentrated mainly on collusive activity by competitors and prescribed 
11 categories of agreement. Firms wishing to engage in these practices 
required the approval of the Commissioner of Trade Practices and 
Prices, who determined whether or not the particular practice was 
5 
1958 No 110. Enacted on and in force from 3 October 1958. 
See Yvonne van Roy, Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, Auckland, 
CCH NZ Ltd, 1991, p 7; and Hunter M Donaldson, "The Development of New 
Zealand Competition Law" in Rex J Adhar (eel), Competition Law and Policy in 
New Zealand, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1991, p 16. 
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contrary to the public interest. 6 The Act did not deal comprehensively 
with the behaviour of monopolies or with issues of market structure.7 
Rather, the apparent policy of the Act in the broader commercial 
context was to regulate monopolies through a combination of price 
control and licensing. 8 
The Commerce Act 19759 replaced the Trade Practices Act 1958, but did 
not evidence any major change in New Zealand's competition policy. 
The new statute was enacted in a context of wide-ranging and detailed 
regulation of the economy. The 1970s saw a continuous process of price 
control by regulations made under the Economic Stabilisation Act 
1948, 10 a situation in which the operation of competitive markets was of 
only secondary importance in keeping prices down. 11 The 1975 Act 
contained no specific provisions directed at attempts to monopolise. 
Rather, the Examiner of Trade Practices could investigate monopolies 12 
and the Commerce Commission had the power to order the divestiture 
of monopolies where they were not in the public interest. 13 Enforcement 
of these provisions and all other provisions in the Act was undertaken 
by public bodies: there was no power for private actions under the Act. 14 
In 1982 a review of the 1975 Act was conducted by the Department of 
Trade and Industry, resulting in a draft Competition Bill. 15 The Bill, 
based on the requirement to harmonise New Zealand and Australian 
commercial law as a consequence of the closer economic relations 
agreement, was not introduced into Parliament. 16 Instead it underwent 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Trade Practices Act 1958, s 19. See van Roy, above, n 5, p 7; and Donaldson, 
above, n 5, p 17. 
Although the Act did make "any complete or partial monopoly of the supply of 
goods in New Zealand, or any practice tending to bring about such complete or 
partial monopoly" an examinable trade practice. Trade Practices Act 1958, 
s 19(2) G) 
Donaldson, above, n 5, p 16. 
1975 No 113. Enacted 10 October 1975, in force from 1 November 1975. See 
reg 2 Commerce Act Commencement Order 1975 (SR 1975/247). 
1948 No 48. Enacted and in force from 19 November 1948. 
Donaldson, above, n 5, pp 18-19. 
Commerce Act 1975, s 61. 
Ibid, s 65. There is no power to order divestiture in the Commerce Act 1986. The 
High Court's powers are limited to granting an injunction restraining a person 
from engaging in conduct which contravenes Part II of the Act (relating to 
restrictive trade practices): Commerce Act 1986, s 81. 
Compare the Commerce Act 1986, which allows private actions for injunctions 
(s 81) and damages (s 82) but not for pecuniary penalties (s 80) 
Donaldson, above, n 5, p 21. 
Van Roy, above, n 5, p 6. 
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further study and refinement in the Department. 17 Some of the fruits of 
this review were included in the Commerce Amendment Act 1983. 18 
Among other changes, the amendment Act lowered the threshold at 
which the Examiner of Trade Practices could being an investigation into 
a monopoly and allowed the Examiner to investigate the conduct of 
monopolies rather than their mere existence. 19 
2.2. Enacting the Commerce Act 1986 
The Commerce Act 1986 completely changed the focus of New 
Zealand's competition policy. It was passed during a time of major 
economic liberalisation which saw the deregulation of much of the New 
Zealand economy accompanied by the corporatisation20 and sometimes 
privatisation of the Government's trading activities.21 This process 
required an effective competition law to complement the changes to the 
economy. This need was recognised by the then Minister of Trade and 
Industry, David Caygill, when he introduced the Commerce Bill in June 
1985:22 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
The Bill represents a key part of the Government's policy to 
improve the performance of the economy and to restore and 
maintain long-term growth. The Bill must be viewed against 
Donaldson, above, n 5, p 21. 
1983 No 144. Enacted on 16 December 1983, in force from 1 April 1984. See 
Donaldson, above, n 5, p 22. 
Ibid, s 22. 
This process involves the reconfiguring of Government trading departments into 
State-owned enterprises with the mandate of operating as efficient and successful 
businesses. See State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 (1986 No 124, enacted 18 
December 1986, in force 19 December 1986), especially ss 4 (duty of every State-
owned enterprise to operate as a successful business, including a requirement to 
operate as profitably as comparable businesses not owned by the Crown). 
For a critical view of this process, see Jane Kelsey, Rolling Back the State: 
Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Wellington, Bridget Williams 
Books, 1993. See also generally, Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, The Fourth 
Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, Auckland, Oxford 
University Press, 1987; 2nd ed, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1990 (now 
subtitled "Policy and Politics in New Zealandn). 
Hon David Caygill, (1985) 463 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 4681 (11 June 
1985). See also the Minister's speech during the second reading of the Bill ((1986) 
506 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (18 March 1986)): 
It will promote competition in the New Zealand marketplace. 
In tandem with other changes, the Bill increases efficiency in the 
New Zealand economy. In particular it will ensure that the 
benefits of a freer economy will not be obstructed by private 
restrictions in the market place. 
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the background of the fundamental change that is occurring in 
the New Zealand economy because of the Government's 
initiatives. As its long title states, the purpose of the Bill is to 
promote competition in New Zealand markets. 23 By doing so, 
the Bill will ensure that, as New Zealand moves away from 
Government regulation of markets, that position will not be 
replaced by anticompetitive behaviour by individual companies 
or groups of traders .... It will ensure that the conditions for 
workable and effective competition exist and that the benefits 
of increased economic efficiency and growth are enjoyed by all 
members of the community, including consumers. 
Seen in the context surrounding its enactment, the Commerce Act 
demonstrates a faith in the ability of markets and competition to further 
the public interest. This represents a fundamental change in the purpose 
of competition law in New Zealand. The aim of the Act, in the context 
of overall economic policy, is to foster a free and open economy with 
minimal central government regulation. This is accompanied by a 
vigilant, but not overly restrictive, oversight of firms' conduct which 
does not further the overall goal of promoting competition. 24 This 
purpose can be contrasted with the goal of maximising efficiency, which 
some have advocated should be the sole end of the Commerce Act. 25 
While efficiency and the promotion of competition often coincide, there 
are occasions where they conflict.26 In such cases the scheme of the Act 
suggests that the promotion of competition should prevail over the 
furtherance of efficiency. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
This purpose was carried through into the Act. 
It is this purpose which the Courts are required to further when deciding 
litigation under the Act. See Goodman Fielder Ltd v Commerce Commission [1987] 
2 NZLR 10. See also Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd (1990) 3 NZBLC 
101,618,101,639 (HC): 
It is the [promotion] of competition which the Court is directed 
to foster. Parliament, as a matter of policy, has decided benefits 
will flow from that course. Whether such is a correct economic 
or social analysis is not a matter for the court. 
See, for example, WA Brock, "The Antitrust Debate in New Zealand: 
Commentary", paper prepared for the NZ Business Roundtable, August 1989, 
p 2; and S Jennings and KM Vautier, "Review Article, Competitive Trading in 
New Zealand: The Commerce Act of 1986" [1988] NZ Recent Law 95. In 
particular the those who counsel efficiency argue that: 
The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to 
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive 
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in 
consumer welfare. 
See Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, New York, 
Basic Books, 1978, p 149. 
See Douglas F Greer, "Efficiency Ancl/Or/Verus/Equals Competition", paper 
prepared for the NZ Institute of Economic Research, September 1988. 
Steven Condie Dealing with Dominant Firms 7 
2.3. "An Act to promote competition in markets 
within New Zealand" 
What is meant by the promotion of competition? The Act states that 
competition means "workable and effective competition" .27 The phrase 
promotion of competition connotes the protection of the competitive 
process rather than the protection of competitors or ex1stmg 
competition. It is significant that Parliament in stating the Act's purpose 
used the word "promote" rather than "protect", "preserve",28 or 
"maintain". 29 Such terms would have suggested a different purpose for 
the Act. They would suggest that the aim was to ensure "workable and 
effective" competition exists at all times.30 Such a purpose would look 
more to the protection of competitors, especially in a market where the 
level of competition, assessed in terms of market structure, could be 
regarded as dangerously low. The use of "promote", on the other hand, 
suggests that competition, in the sense of existing rivalry between firms, 
is to be encouraged and supported, but need not necessarily occur. 
Accordingly, anticompetitive conduct undertaken by a single firm which 
is not in a dominant position is not a violation of the Act.31 
In this context it should be noted that the question of whether a 
particular firm is dominant in a market must be assessed having regard 
to, inter alia, the constraints imposed on the firm by potential 
competition.32 Thus there may be competition in a market, even if the 
market at any one time consists of only one firm, if its actions are 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Commerce Act 1986, s 3(1). 
The Australian Trade Practices Act 1965 was intituled "an Act to preserve 
competition in Australian trade and commerce to the extent required by the 
public interest". See J P Nieuwenhuysen, "The Theory of Competition Policy", 
in Alan Ransom and Warren Pengilley, eds, Restrictive Trade Practices: judgments, 
Materials, and Policy, Sydney, Legal Books Pty Ltd, 1985, p 20. 
Greer, above, n 26, treats the words "maintain" (meaning to cause to continue, to 
keep up, or preserve) and "promote" (meaning to help forward, encourage, or 
support actively) as synonymous, when clearly they are not . Ibid p 11. This, 
perhaps, causes him to over-emphasise the potential conflicts between the goals of 
furthering efficiency and promoting competition. 
Commerce Act 1986, s 3(1). 
However, see Barry Allen, "The Status of Collusion and Common Purpose 
Under Section 27, Commerce Act 1986", LLM Seminar Paper (Competition 
Law), 1996, which argues that the current interpretation of s 27 Commerce Act 
1986 (prohibiting contracts, arrangements, or understandings substantially 
lessening competition) allows that provision to be invoked to censure conduct by 
an individual firm where it attempts to achieve a monopoly. 
Commerce Act 1986, s 3(8)(b). 
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sufficiently constrained by the threat of competition. The Act, then, 
regards competition as a process occurring over time rather than a static 
concept. In Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Assn Ltd33 the Australian 
Trade Practices Tribunal considered that "Competition is a process 
rather than a situation."34 The competitive process, which can result in 
the elimination of competition, is the focus of the Act, not the 
protection of competitors.35 
2.4. Section 36 Commerce Act 1986 
The application of the Act's general purpose is illustrated by s 36(1) 
Commerce Act 1986. This provision prevents any person36 possessing a 
dominant position37 in a market38 from using39 that position for a 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
(1976) ATPR 140-012. 
Ibid, p 17,246. 
See also Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson above, n 24, 101,652; Fisher & Paykel 
Ltd v Commerce Commission (1990) 3 NZBLC 101,655, 101,680; Auckland 
Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 
647,671; (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,041, 103,602. 
A person includes "any association of persons whether incorporated or not". 
Commerce Act 1986, s 2. 
A person is in a dominant position in a market if it acquires or supplies goods or 
services in a market either alone or with an interconnected body corporate and "is 
in a position to exercise a dominant influence over the production, acquisition, 
supply, or price of goods or services in that market". Ibid, s 3(8). In deciding 
whether a particular person is dominant regard is to be had to three factors . Ibid, 
s 3(8)(a) to (c). See Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 
NZLR 429 (CA); Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission unreported, 3 July 
1996, CA169/95; and Ross H Patterson, "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant 
Position in New Zealand Competition Law: From Economic Concept to Latin 
Derivation" (1993) 15 NZULR 265 (arguing that the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Telecom v Commerce Commission by moving from an economic approach 
concerning the question of market dominance to an approach based on dictionary 
definitions of the term "dominance" "turned the established jurisprudence on its 
head" (ibid, p 280) and "represents a major set-back to the development of New 
Zealand's competition law" (ibid, p 288)). This paper assumes for the question of 
argument the existence of market dominance. This paper also uses the terms 
"market power", "market dominance", "dominant position", and "monopoly 
power" interchangeably unless the context otherwise requires. 
A reference to a "market" in the Act is a reference to a "market in New Zealand 
for goods and services that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are 
substitutable for them." Commerce Act 1986, s 3(1A) (as substituted by s 3(1) 
Commerce Amendment Act 1990 (1990 No 41, RS 32. Enacted 29 June 1990, in 
force from 1 July 1990)). The question of market definition is one of considerable 
importance to any antitrust litigation. Defining the relevant market is "the first 
step towards the assessment of the current state of competition and the nature and 
extent of any inhibition of competition": Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Retail Marketing 
Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358 (CA) . 
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number of specified ant1compet1t1ve purposes. 40 This prov1s10n 1s not 
aimed at the policing the existence or acquisition of a monopoly. 41 This 
can be contrasted to earlier competition law in New Zealand which, 
until 1984, examined the existence or acquisition of monopolies rather 
than their conduct. 42 Instead the Commerce Act 1986 looks solely at the 
conduct and purpose of dominant firms. It is not the existence of 
dominant market power which is the concern of the Act but its 
exercise. 43 There must be some use of market dominance which sets the 
conduct aside from everyday competitive trading. 44 Accordingly, the Act 
as a whole and the section in particular seek to promote vigorous 
competition by individual firms; it does not seek to protect individual 
traders from the actions of dominant firms. 45 Predatory or exclusionary 
tactics, if undertaken by individual firms without market power, are 
legal because the Act assumes that such behaviour is ineffective without 
market dominance. 46 For example a firm in a competitive market which 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
The appropriate test to be applied to determine whether a dominant firm has used 
its dominance is at the centre of this paper. This element of s 36 is generally 
referred to in this paper as the conduct element. 
Commerce Act 1986, s 36(1)(a) to (c) . 
The Commerce Act contains provisions for the impos1t10n of price controls 
where, for example, a dominant firm is extracting monopoly prices. The 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the Minister of Commerce may 
impose price controls on specified goods or services. The Minister may not make 
such a recommendation unless he or she is satisfied that competition in the 
market for the goods or services is limited or is likely to be lessened and it is 
necessary or desirable in the interests of users, consumers, or suppliers that prices 
be controlled. The Minister, before making a recommendation, may request the 
Commerce Commission to report on the desirability of imposing price controls. 
Ibid, SS 52-54. 
See above, text accompanying notes 3 to 19. 
See Mark Berry, et al, Gaitlt on Commercial Law, Wellington, Brooker's, 1994, 
1CA36.Intro.Ol, p 3-144 (updated to 6/5/94). 
If a dominant firm were prevented from engaging everyday trading then it is 
arguable that, in order to promote competition, divestiture provisions would 
logically be needed to supplement the existing enforcement provisions of the Act. 
In contrast to previous New Zealand legislation such provisions are notably 
absent from the Commerce Act 1986. 
An agrument for the contrary interpretation of s 36 can be made. The ability to 
institute private actions in conjunction with the wording of the section, which 
speaks of eliminating a person from or detering a person's entry into a market, 
could lead to the inference that the provision is designed to protect individual 
traders rather than the competitive process itself. See John Land, "Monoplisation: 
The Practical Implications of Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986" (1988) 18 
VUWLR 51, 52; and van Roy, above, n 3, p 148. 
Such an assumption is probably unwarranted. A firm possessing market power 
but which does not dominate the market may well be able to undertake predatory 
or exclusionary conduct successfully, in the sense of eliminating competition in a 
manner which is not competition on the merits. However, arguably other 
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refuses to deal in goods or services required by a firm in a second market 
will be undertaking a counter-productive strategy, as it will simply drive 
the potential purchaser to other suppliers.47 Firms may generally 
undertake an entire range of action and are only prevented from doing 
so when they face no competition because they are dominant in a 
particular market. Conversely, when a firm possesses market dominance, 
the Act limits its freedom of action. While the dominant firm may act 
competitively,48 even in an aggressively competitive fashion, it cannot 
engage in conduct which uses its dominance.49 
Section 36, then, can be described as a consumer welfare provision, m 
the sense that phrase was used by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd: 50 
the object of s [36] is to protect the interests of consumers, the 
operation of the section being predicated on the assumption 
that competition is a means to that end. 
3. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 36 
COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Having examined the purpose of the Act, and of s 36 in particular, it is 
now time to examine the practical application of the provisions. The 
focus of this section is on the conduct element of s 36, which was first 
fully explored by the Australian High Court in Queensland Wire 
47 
48 
49 
50 
provisions of the Commerce Act 1986, especially s 27, provide scope for the 
Courts to prevent such attempted monopolisation. See Allan, above, n 31. 
Whether the use of s 27 in this way furthers the purpose of the Act is, it is 
submitted, a highly contentious point. 
See Berkey Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 603 F 2d 263, 291 (2nd Cir, 1979) cert 
denied 444 US 1093 (1980). 
See Union Shipping, above, n 24, at p 662; 101,618 ("If a person acts in a normal 
competitive fashion, as he would whether dominant or not, that person can 
hardly be said to be 'using dominance' "). 
This paper contends that "use" is the engine-room of the provision. The question 
of the "purpose" of the dominant firm is, following recent case law, of minor and 
perhaps diversionary importance in the scheme of the section. Cf Janet M 
November, "The Meaning of 'Use' of a Dominant Position: from Queensland 
Wire to Electricity Corp v Geotherm Energy" (1993) 23 VUWLR 191, 206 ("a 
dominant firm acting in a 'normal competitive fashion' ... may well be 'using 
dominance'; however it will not be breaching the section unless it also acts with 
one of the proscribed purposes".) 
(1989) A TPR ,40-925, 50,010. In that case the High Court of Australia considered 
s 46 Trade Practice Act 1976 (Cth), which is the Australian equivalent of s 36. 
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Industries Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Ltd. 51 The test elaborated by the case is 
examined and contrasted with another test proposed by an Australian 
Court. This section then discusses the recent New Zealand cases of 
Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd52 and Commerce 
Commission v Port Nelson Ltd. 53 
3.1. Australian Authorities 
3.1.1. Queensland Wire Industries Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Ltd 
This case concerned a refusal to deal by a firm with almost 
overwhelming market dominance. In the course of its decision, the High 
Court discussed the meaning of the words "take advantage of" in s 46 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Departing from earlier case law,54 the 
Court held that the words meant nothing more than "use" ,55 thus 
rendering the conduct element of s 46 identical to s 36 Commerce Act. 
The High Court then proceeded to elaborate on what was meant by 
" ,, use . 
Mason CJ and Wilson J delivered a joint judgment. The Justices 
emphasised the purpose of s 46 Trade Practices Act: the promotion of 
competition as the means of ensuring consumer welfare.56 They noted 
that competition was a "deliberate and ruthless" process in which 
successful firms injured competitors, sometimes fatally.57 From this 
platform Mason CJ and Wilson J turned to the actions of the defendant 
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP), which was not constrained by 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Ibid. 
Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd (1992) 5 TCLR 166 (HC); 
Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd (1993) 5 TCLR 413 (CA); 
Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd (1994) 6 TCLR 138 (PC). 
Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd (1995) 6 TCLR 406 (HC); Port Nelson 
Ltd v Commerce Commission above, n 37 (CA). 
Previous decisions had interpreted the words "take advantage of" as possessing 
pejorative overtones; they were held to require misuse rather than simply use of 
market power. See Midland Milk Pty v Victorian Dairy Industry Authority (1988) 
82 ALR 279, 297. This was the approach adopted by the trial judge, Pincus J, in 
Queensland Wire, where he referred to an "abuse of position, to something 
unusual, predatory, forcful, or deceitful". See Qi,eensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v 
Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1987) ATPR 140-810, 48,818. 
Above, n 50, p 50,QlO, per Mason CJ and Wilson J, p 50,012, per Deane J, 
p 50,016, per Dawson J, p 50,023, per Toohey J. 
Ibid, p 50,010. 
Ibid. 
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compet1t1ve pressures. They concluded that BHP was taking advantage 
of its substantial market power:58 
It is only by virtue of its control of the market and the absence 
of other suppliers that BHP can afford, in a commercial sense, 
to withhold Y-bar from the appellant. If BHP lacked that 
market power-in other words, if it were operating in a 
competitive market-it is highly unlikely that it would stand 
by, without any effort to compete, and allow the appellant to 
secure its supply of Y-bar from a competitor. 
Dawson J reached a similar conclusion. His Honour found that BHP 
used its market power "in a manner made possible only in the absence of 
competitive conditions."59 
The effect of these passages has been summarised by one commentator as 
follows: 60 
The common thread ... is that in order to constitute a taking 
advantage of market power the conduct must be of a kind that 
a corporation can only 'get away with' because it has market 
power and because of the absence of competitive conditions. 
3.1.2. Other Australian Decisions 
Other Australian decisions have taken a different approach to the 
question of use. For example the Court in Natwest Australia Bank Ltd v 
Baral Gerrad Strapping Systems Pty Ltd61 suggested that:62 
The conduct must either by necessary implication from its very 
nature or by reference to other pleaded facts and circumstances 
constitute a use of that power. . . There must be a causal 
connection between the conduct alleged and the market power 
pleaded such that it can be said that the conduct is a use of that 
power. 
The authors of Gault on Commercial Lau/>3 believe that the "causation" 
is the best approach to the question of use in s 36.64 It is submitted, 
however, that this test is not helpful in identifying conduct which 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
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Ibid. 
Ibid, p 50,016. 
S G Corones, Restrictive Trade Practices Law, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1994, 
p 183. 
(1992) ATPR 141-196. 
Ibid, p 40,644. 
Above, n 43. 
Ibid, 1CA36.08. 
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violates s 36 Commerce Act 1986. In particular, suggesting that "use" 
should simply be regarded as providing a causal connection between the 
possession of dominance and the conduct complained of does not 
provide any answer at all to the central problem. First, this approach to 
causation is unusual. It appears to suggest that a dominant firm's use of 
its market power may be caused by that market power rather than by 
the firm itself. However, in law, causation normally refers to particular 
acts or omissions to act rather that the context in which the conduct 
occurs. 65 The idea of causation in normally implies some human action. 
Causation-as-context limits the role for human action and could be taken 
to suggest that a dominant firm in some circumstances cannot help but 
"use" its market power in an anticompetitive manner and thus violate 
the section. As such, the test is a mire of indeterminacy. There is no way 
to tell from the terms of the test itself which conduct will be a "use" of 
market power and which will not. Applying such a test would make it 
virtually impossible for dominant firms to monitor their own conduct, 
as despite their best efforts, a Court may still decide that their conduct 
was a use of their market power. This clearly runs contrary to the 
purpose of the Commerce Act.66 If dominant firms are to compete 
vigorously then they require some degree of certainty in which to 
operate. A failure to abide by the requirements of the section can result 
in large sanctions. 67 
Secondly, it is arguable that the test adds nothing to that suggested by 
the High Court of Australia in Queensland Wire. 68 If the test can be 
rephrased in terms of the test for causation in torts it comes out as 
"would the conduct have occurred but for the firm's possession of 
dominance". This does not advance the test any further; however it is 
possible to again rephrase it. The test could be expressed as "would the 
dominant firm have undertaken the conduct if it did not possess market 
dominance". This, it is submitted, is functionally identical to the test in 
65 
66 
67 
68 
This is the sense in which the term is used in the law of torts. See Stephen Todd, 
The Law of Torts in New Zealand, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1992, eh 16. As 
competititon law is closely related to tort law, it is submitted that this 
comparison is apt. 
See text accompanying notes 20 to SO above. 
A firm can be subject to pecuniary penalties of up to SS million for violating s 36. 
See Commerce Act 1986, s 80. 
Above, n SO. 
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Queensland Wire69 as both, at least by implication, examine the 
likelihood that the conduct in question would have been undertaken by 
a firm not possessing dominance. 
It is submitted, therefore, that stating that use is nothing more than a 
causative element between the possession of dominance and purpose is 
not a particularly satisfactory way of approaching the problem. Either 
the approach does not provide sufficient guidance for the dominant firm 
to monitor and correct its conduct or the test adds nothing to that 
proposed by the High Court of Australia in Queensland Wire.7° If the 
former is correct the approach should be abandoned as it does not 
promote competition and is therefore contrary to the purpose of the 
Commerce Act 1986. If the latter is correct, the test only creates 
potential confusion and should be disregarded. 
3.2. New Zealand Decisions 
3.2.1. Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd 
The Privy Council's decision in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
v Clear Communications Ltd1 1 provides the authoritative New Zealand 
exposition of the correct test for "use" of a dominant position. That 
decision concerned Clear's attempts to connect to Telecom's Public 
Service Telecommunications Network. By interconnecting with this 
network, Clear proposed to offer a local telephone service for business 
customers in the central business districts of the major centres which 
would compete with the service already operated by Telecom. Clear 
would compete with Telecom by operating its own lines from its 
exchange-or switch-to its own customers. It would duplicate 
Telecom's existing network for the central business district. Clear, for 
reasons of expense, did not wish service to suburban or rural 
customers.72 
Telecom and Clear competed in the same market, defined by the High 
Court as the national market for standard switched telecommunications 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Above, n 52. 
Ibid, (1992) 5 TCLR at p 170. 
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services.73 This refers to fixed or hard-wired telephones rather than 
mobile cellular telephones.74 Clear needed access to Telecom's network 
to enable its customers to call Telecom's customers and vice versa. In 
other words, Telecom's network was an essential facility, access to 
which was a prerequisite for a competitor to successfully enter the 
market. 
However, the s1tuat10n m this case can be distinguished from the 
archetypal essential facilities cases in at least two ways. First, Telecom 
did not refuse to deal. It always accepted that it must allow Clear to 
connect to its network. However, Telecom set a pricing strategy which 
Clear maintained was unreasonable, in that it could not make a sufficient 
return if it was required to pay the interconnection fee which Telecom 
demanded. Secondly, Telecom's conduct was not that of a firm 
possessing a natural monopoly refusing access to the facility in a 
vertically adjacent market, or at least refusing to do so on reasonable 
terms.75 Telecom and Clear were competitors in the same market or 
markets.76 
The central issue in the case at all stages of its life was the mechanism by 
which a price could be fixed for Clear's interconnection to Telecom's 
network.77 In the High Court, the dispute essentially concerned how 
access to the networks should be characterised. Telecom's position was 
that Clear should be treated as a customer; Clear's position was that the 
two parties should be treated as equal network competitors with access 
to each other's network subject to a balancing payment representing 
disparities in traffic. 78 
In the High Court Telecom proposed the "Baumol/Willig rule", a rule 
formulated by two American economics professors, as the basis for any 
agreement on interconnection pricing structure. This remained its 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Ibid, p 199. Although Telecom did not agree with the assessment of the relevant 
market, it did conceed it was dominant in whatever market the Court found to be 
relevant . Ibid, p 198. 
Ibid, p 198. 
See Kenneth L Glazer and Abbott B Libsky, Jr, "Unilateral Refusals to Deal 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act" (1995) 63 Antitrust LJ 749, 775. 
Above, n 52, (1992) 5 TCLR 198. 
Ibid, (1994) 6 TCLR at p 141, 143. 
Ibid, (1992) 5 TCLR at p 207. 
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pos1t1on throughout the course of the litigation. The Privy Council 
described the effect of the rule as follows: 79 
The consequence of applying this model to the present case is 
to say that Telecom is acting in a way which does not involve 
the use of its dominant market position if it allows Clear to 
interconnect to the Telecom network on payment of first, the 
average incremental cost to Telecom of providing the 
[network] plus the revenue Telecom would have received had it 
supplied the service to the Clear customers less the cost saved 
by Telecom by reason of Clear providing and handling and 
calls to or from a Clear customer over the sector from the 
interconnection with Telecom's network and the Clear 
customer, and vice versa. 
It was accepted by Professor Baumol that the rule would allow Telecom 
to recoup monopoly rents both from any inefficiencies in its operation 
and from any profits in excess of a reasonable return on investment that 
it received from its operation. It was argued, however, that if Clear was 
more efficient than Telecom, it would be able to charge less than 
Telecom for calls which did not connect to the Telecom network and 
for that part of calls which did connect to the Telecom network but 
which were also carried part of the way by Clear. Competition caused 
by these lower charges would have the effect of eventually "competing 
out" any monopoly profits which Telecom may obtain from its 
network. 80 
While the Baumol/Willig rule was accepted by the High Court as not 
being a use of a monopoly position, this opinion was not shared by the 
Court of Appeal.8 1 Cooke P (as he then was) held that the rule was 
"obviously anticompetitive" as it required a new entrant to the market 
to "indemnify the monopolist for loss of custom". 82 Gault J83 highlighted 
the discrepancies between the model proposed by Professors Baumol and 
Willig and what would occur in a perfectly contestable market. That the 
model allowed monopoly profits for the incumbent when these would 
79 
80 
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83 
Ibid, (1994) 6 TCLR at p 146. Emphasis in original . 
Ibid, at p 147. This conclusion was also accepted by the High Court, which 
accepted that while the Baumol/Willig rule was imperfect, it was more likely than 
other formula to improve competition in New Zealand telecommunications. The 
Court did accept the possiblility that Clear may not be able make a sufficient 
profit from its service. See ibid, (1992) 5 TCLR at p 217. 
Ibid, (1993) 5 TCLR 413 . 
Ibid, p 416. 
With whom Richardson J (as he then was) agreed in all respects (ibid, p 417), and 
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not be available in a perfectly contestable market "invites the conclusion 
that the model is imperfect."84 Further, Gault J refused to accept the 
argument that Clear's lower costs and lower prices would eventually 
"compete out" Telecom's monopoly profits. His Honour pointed out 
that the inclusion of monopoly profits in the price charged to Clear 
might deter it from entering the market in the first place. Further, the 
process by which the access levy was to be calculated meant that Clear 
would be placed at a further disadvantage, especially if the reviews were 
not frequent enough. 85 Gault J concluded the Baumol/Willig rule was a 
use of a dominant position as "I cannot accept that the objects of the 
Commerce Act are served by a method of pricing that secures the profits 
of a firm in a dominant position."86 
The question before the Privy Council was whether Telecom by 
insisting on the Baumol/Willig rule as the basis of its charging regime 
for access to its network was using its dominant position. 87 In 
approaching the question of "use", their Lordships emphasised the 
importance of commercial certainty. In particular the Board rejected a 
suggestion by Gault J that in approaching the question it may be helpful 
to look at whether the dominant firm has "acted reasonably or with 
justification". 88 Their Lordships held that such a test would place a 
dominant firm in "an impossible position". 89 It would face difficulty in 
defending its genuinely-held belief that its actions were reasonable and 
justified as a Court may well come to a different conclusion. This would 
expose the dominant firm to damages and quasi-criminal penalties. Their 
Lordships concluded that in their view, "s 36 must be construed in such 
a way as to enable the monopolist, before he enters upon a line of 
conduct, to know with some certainty whether or not it is lawful."90 
84 
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Ibid, p 433. 
Ibid, pp 435-6. 
Ibid, p 436. 
Their Lordships had little time for Telecom's argument that it did not have an 
anticompetitive purpose. Their Lordships found that Telecom's task was 
"hopeless ... not only because it would be most improbable that Telecom lacked 
the purpose to deter its bitter rival, Clear, but also because its past conduct and 
certain of its internal memoranda show that in fact it did have that purpose." Ibid, 
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From this position, their Lordships then considered what, in their view, 
constituted the correct approach to the question of use. They noted that 
the "statutory words provide no explanation as to the distinction 
between conduct which does, and conduct which does not" constitute 
use of a dominant position. 91 They stated that it was both legitimate and 
necessary to approach to question from the position of a hypothetical 
seller in a competitive market. 92 That is, the action of the dominant firm 
must be compared to the actions of a hypothetical firm in a competitive 
market. In order for that comparison to be valid the hypothetical firm 
must be viewed as being in the same situation as the dominant firm in 
question. Their Lordships concluded: 93 
it cannot be said that a person in a dominant position "uses" 
that position for the purposes of s 36 [if]94 he acts in a way 
which a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the 
same circumstances would have acted. 
Their Lordship's test, therefore, concentrates on those aspects of the 
dominant firm's behaviour that are likely to occur only if a firm 
possesses a dominant position. The idea of dominance necessarily 
suggests a lack of competitive restraint. 95 It is important to note the 
Privy Council used the word "would" in this test rather than "could". 
The test does not encompass all the potential acts a firm in a competitive 
market could do. Rather, it refers to the actions of a rational firm 
attempting to maximise its profit in a competitive market and 
necessarily constrained by the competitive conditions of that market. 
91 
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Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
In their original judgment their Lordships used the word "unless" rather that "if". 
As the authors of Gault on Commercial Law, above, n 43, at para CA36.08, p 3-
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Hospitals Assn (Auckland Branch) v Northern Regional Health Authority unreported, 
7 /12/94, Blanchard J, HC Auckland CP440/94, at p 27 of the unreported 
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Section 3(8)(b) Commerce Act 1986 states that in assessing whether a firm is 
dominant in a particular market one of the factors to be considered is "the extent 
to which that person is constrained by the conduct of competitors or potential 
competitors in that market." Section 46(3) of Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974 
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Steven Condie Dealing with Dominant Firms 19 
Essentially, the test asks nothing more than whether there are 
commercial justifications for the dominant firm's actions that would 
hold true if the firm were subject to competition. The test focuses on 
those actions that a rational profit-maximising firm would undertake in 
the pursuit of increased profits and increased market share. The 
application of the test requires that the actions of the dominant firm are 
compared with what the same firm, acting according to conventional 
economic logic and on the basis of conventional economic assumptions, 
would do if it were in a fully competitive market. If a firm substantially 
in the same circumstances as the dominant firm but in a competitive 
market would not have acted as the dominant firm did in any particular 
case then the dominant firm has used its market dominance and thereby 
breached s 36.96 
Several commentators have disagreed with the test propounded by the 
Privy Council in the Telecom case. The main criticism of the judgment is 
that it has limited the scope of s 36 to the extent that test does not meet 
the purpose of the section. Van Roy argues that the Privy Council's test, 
"if adhered to rigidly, is a giant step backwards. It has the potential to 
remove from the scope of s 36 a good deal of conduct already decided as 
contravening that section". 97 This particular criticism has little force to 
it, and is akin to saying that the Privy Council is bound by the decisions 
of the lower Courts. Van Roy's criticisms have more force when she 
argues that the Privy Council's test does not further the purpose of the 
Act. However, it appears that she misstates the test when she states that 
it excludes from s 36 "anything that a firm which is not dominant can 
do".98 As noted above, the Privy Council's test does not refer to what a 
non-dominant firm could do, but what a non-dominant firm would do. 
This requires the application of conventional economic theory to 
discover whether a non-dominant firm in a competitive market would 
have acted in the same way as the dominant firm has done. It does not 
96 
97 
98 
Section 36 Commerce Act also requires that the dominant firm act with an 
anticompetitive purpose. However, as is argued below (see text accompanying 
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necessitate, as van Roy implies, an analysis of all the possible activities 
that a non-dominant firm could undertake and then require their 
automatic exclusion from the scope of s 36. Where a dominant firm 
undertakes activities that a non-dominant firm also could undertake, the 
Privy Council test looks at whether a non-dominant firm otherwise in 
the same circumstances as the dominant firm, seeking to maximise profit 
and constrained by the activities of competitors, would have undertaken 
those activities at all. 
That said, it is still distinctly arguable that the Privy Council misapplied 
its own test to the conduct before it. If Telecom were not in a dominant 
position, that is, if it were constrained by actual or potential 
competition, there would by no element of monopoly profit in the 
charge levied under the Baumol/Willig rule. A firm in a competitive 
market could not insist on charging an access fee which included 
monopoly profits because by very definition they would not exist.99 
While the rule may provide a perfectly acceptable regime on which to 
base access levies in a competitive market it is not so in the case of one 
dominated by a single firm. There will generally always be the 
opportunity for it to reap monopoly profits. 
The final significant aspect to consider in the Privy Council's decision is 
their Lordship's treatment of the purpose requirement of s 36. Earlier 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court had noted the 
difficulty in distinguishing the two elements. In Electricity Corp Ltd v 
Geotherm Energy Ltd100 the Court of Appeal discussed Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd. 101 The Court of Appeal 
noted: 102 
99 
The actual conduct under scrutiny in that case was refusal to 
supply goods. That could have been done by a supplier with a 
single customer. It was not the conduct itself that amounted to 
a use of market power for the particular purpose but the 
conduct in the market for that particular anticompetitive 
purpose. This illustrates the difficulty in separating use of 
market dominance and purpose. 
This is essentially the reasoning of Gault J in the Court of Appeal . Above, n 52, 
(1993) 5 TCLR at p 433. 
too [1992) 2 NZLR 641. 
IOI Above, n 50. 
102 Above, n 100, p 649. 
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This concern was echoed by McGechan J m Commerce Commission v 
Port Nelson Ltd. 103 
The Privy Council's approach to this question was to effectively 
subsume the issue of purpose into the major consideration of whether 
the firm had used its market dominance. It noted that: 104 
If a person has used his dominant position it is hard to imagine 
a case in which he would have done otherwise that for the 
purpose of producing an anticompetitive effect; there will be 
no need to use the dominant position in the process of 
ordinary competition. 
Their Lordships then noted that 1t was legitimate to infer 
anticompetitive purpose from use of a dominant position but possibly 
dangerous to infer use from purpose. This was because firms which are 
aggressively competitive have, in one sense, the purpose of eliminating 
their competitors from the market. 105 This suggests that the Privy 
Council believed that it may be very difficult if not impossible to 
distinguish between a competitive purpose to eliminate competitors and 
an anticompetitive purpose to do the same. Finally, the Privy Council 
noted that in the situation before it, "it would be most improbable that 
Telecom lacked the purpose to deter its bitter rival, Clear" .106 
Taken together, these dicta clearly limit the scope of any inquiry into 
purpose. In effect, purpose is demonstrated by proof that a dominant 
position has been used. This conclusion finds support in the Privy 
Council's test for use, 107 which is in essence also a test for objective 
purpose, in the sense that it looks to the nature and effect of the conduct 
. . 
m issue. 
3.2.2. Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd 
So far there has been only one significant case discussing in any detail the 
requirements of s 36 in light of the decision in the Telecom case. In 
Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd, 108 McGechan J was required to 
ascertain whether certain actions of Port Nelson Ltd (PNL) contravened 
I03 Above, n 53, at p 557. 
104 Above, n 52, (1994) 6 TCLR at p 154. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
I07 Discussesd above in text accompanying notes 87 to 99. 
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s 36. In that case PNL had dominance in the market for tug services, in 
the market for pilotage services, and in wharves in the Nelson Harbour. 
The question was whether it had used its dominant position in those 
three markets for the purpose of deterring or eliminating its competitor, 
Tasman Bay Marine Pilots Ltd. This question arose in relation to three 
specific activities carried out by PNL: a requirement that persons using 
its tugs must also use its pilots (the "tug tie"); offering a 5 percent 
discount across all port services if ships used PNL's tugs, lines, pilots, 
and stevedoring labour; and imposing a $100 minimum pilotage charge 
for all vessels below a certain size. 
McGechan J approached the question of the tug tie using the test 
advanced by the Privy Council. The question was: would a firm which 
was not dominant in tugs, pilotage, and wharves but otherwise in the 
same circumstances as PNL require that those making use of its tugs 
make use of its pilots? McGechan J found that in the abstract the answer 
was probably that a firm subject to competition would not insist on a 
tug tie. It would not risk the fact that another firm seeking to make use 
of its tugs would baulk at the requirement that it must also hire pilots. 
"By seeking to have both operations, [a competitive firm] would risk 
losing both." 109 This was not a risk many firms would take. However, 
there could exist perfectly valid reasons in the surrounding commercial 
circumstances which would require a competitive firm to impose a tug 
tie. These could include questions over the quality of other pilots or 
potential labour problems. McGechan J believed this case was one where 
the surrounding commercial circumstances went both to the dominant 
firms' use of its position and to its anticompetitive purpose: 110 
one must look at the commercial circumstances and steps taken 
at the time as pointing to the course which a non-dominant 
firm would have taken in relation to a tie and onward to actual 
purpose. 
His Honour found that despite the number of explanations put forward, 
PNL's purpose in imposing the tug tie was to eliminate competition. In 
other words, the circumstances put forward to justify the tug tie did not 
exist. There was no possible honestly commercial or competitive 
justification for PNL's actions. The only possible reason was the desire 
109 Ibid, at pp 556-7. 
110 Ibid, at p 557. 
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to destroy a competitor. As there was no justification in the surrounding 
circumstances for the tug tie, a firm in a competitive situation would not 
have imposed it. Therefore, PNL used its dominant position. The 
absence of any circumstances which would justify the behaviour in a 
competitive market was partially demonstrated by the existence of 
PNL's purpose of killing competition. The lack of commercial 
justification in turn bolstered the Court's conclusion that PNL acted 
with an anticompetitive purpose. 
Turning to the question of the discount PNL offered for its services, 
McGechan J again looked at the surrounding circumstances to conclude 
that the discount was not a use of the company's dominant position. His 
Honour held that: 111 
Irrespective of questions of dominance, it could make good 
sense to stimulate through-put by discounting at rational levels, 
so promoting use of labour across all activities, hopefully 
achieving compensating economies of scale and scope. The 
figures would need to be calculated ... but the non-dominant 
firm would be likely to do the same. 
Even though PNL had acted with an anticompetitive purpose, it had 
acted in a way that a competitive firm, otherwise in the same 
circumstances, also would. 
Finally, McGechan J turned to the question of the $100 minimum fee for 
the use of its tug services. His Honour concluded that a competitive firm 
was likely to exercise the same commercial judgment as had PNL. It 
would make its decision on the basis of "commercial intuition" 112 using 
the criteria of not wishing to impose a trivial charge while not deterring 
custom by imposing too high a charge. These criteria were the same for a 
non-dominant firm as for a dominant firm, and the price set by both 
firms would likely be the same or similar. Accordingly, PNL did not use 
its dominant position. 
In summary, his Honour found that PNL had used its dominant 
position for an anticompetitive purpose when instituting the tug tie 
requirement. It had not used its dominant position, even though 
McGechan J found it may have had an anticompetitive purpose, when it 
gave a 5 percent "across the board" discount to customers who used a 
111 Ibid, at p 558. 
112 Ibid, at p 559. 
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range of its services, or when it imposed a $100 minimum fee for tug 
services. The case is an example of the practical application of the Privy 
Council's test from Telecom. His Honour made use of the same 
circumstances arm of their Lordship's test to discover whether a non-
dominant firm would have acted in same manner as PNL did in this 
case. In particular, McGechan J made use of the circumstances in which 
PNL found itself in to gauge whether the explanations which that firm 
gave for its conduct were actual commercial reasons, or whether they 
were simply a cover for acts which amounted to use of its dominant 
position. Importantly, McGechan J also looked at the particular conduct 
which PNL undertook. His Honour carefully considered the precise 
circumstances of the individual practices to discern whether a firm in a 
competitive market but otherwise in the same situation would have 
acted in a similar way. 
The application of the Privy Council test in Commerce Commission v 
Port Nelson Ltd is obviously correct in terms of the overall purpose of 
s 36. The section requires that firms, including dominant firms, be 
allowed to compete in a vigorous fashion. The only sensible test for 
whether such conduct has occurred must involve comparison with the 
likely conduct of an identical firm in a competitive market, but 
otherwise in the same circumstances. To a great extent this will depend 
on whether there are valid commercial justifications for the actions of 
the dominant firm. To do otherwise would have the potential to place 
and onerous burden on dominant firms and stifle their competitive 
energies. Unless the questioned particular activity is something that a 
firm facing competition would not do it cannot truly be said that the 
dominant firm has taken advantage of its position. 1 D 
However, this case also demonstrates the difficulty in applying the 
section caused by the requirement to show an anticompetitive purpose. 
In applying s 36. McGechan was forced to traverse the same ground 
IIJ The Court of Appeal has considered the judgment of the High Court in Port 
Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission on appeal. See Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce 
Commission, above, n 37. In that case the Court did not address to any extent the 
question of "use" of a dominant position. However, it did foreshadow the 
possibility that shoud the issue of "use" come squarely before it in a future case it 
would not necessarily regard the Privy Council's approach favourably. 
Specifically, the Court said, "it is not easy to see why use of a dominant position 
should not be determined simply as a question of fact without the need to 
postulate artificial scenarios". Ibid, p 42 of the unreported judgment. 
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twice: once for "use" and once for "purpose". As the Act promotes 
competition, it is best to focus on conduct which is objectively contrary 
to the purpose of the Act. If a firm can act with an anticompetitive 
purpose and not violate the section, and if a finding of anticompetitive 
conduct will almost inevitably lead to a finding of anticompetitive 
purpose, then the existence of a separate purpose element in s 36 serves 
no useful function and ought to be removed. By including both conduct 
and objective purpose, the Privy Council's test for "use" effectively 
renders the purpose element of the section. As the test furthers the 
purpose of the Act and the section, it is submitted that legislative 
amendment is desirable to codify the Privy Council's approach. 
New Zealand's competition law, then, when assessing the behaviour of 
dominant firms does so on an objective basis. This provides certainty for 
dominant firms. The law tells them that if they compete aggressively 
using techniques which a firm which was not in their dominant position 
would also use they have nothing to fear from s 36. As will be seen in 
the next section, a remarkably similar approach has been adopted by the 
United States Courts. In effect the United States Courts would reach the 
same results as New Zealand Courts using the same basic reasoning 
when confronted with similar problems. It is submitted that New 
Zealand can profitably take much from the United States experience. On 
the other hand the law of the European Community does not have the 
same crispness of approach which characterises New Zealand and United 
States law. Community law provides a less appropriate model for the 
New Zealand Courts to draw from. 
4. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW 
4.1. Sherman Act 1980 
4.1.1. Legislative origins and purpose 
The provision in United States federal law applicable to the actions of 
dominant forms is§ 2 Sherman Act 1890. 114 This section states that: 115 
114 15 USCA § 2 (1982). 
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Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony. 
26 
The purpose of the Sherman Act is difficult to ascertain from both the 
wording of the statute and the evidence that exists of the intention of its 
drafters. The words employed by the statute are vague and do not 
specify prohibited conduct. The legislative history-the speeches of the 
legislators in the debates accompanying its enactment-is similarly vague. 
The Sherman Bill originally dealt only with combinations. However, § 2 
was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee in order to improve the 
coverage of the legislation. 116 It seems clear that the legislators intended 
to promote competition. 117 However, beyond this most obvious of 
statements, it is difficult not to conclude that the legislative history is 
even more vague than the statutory words themselves and accordingly 
deserves little weight. 118 Perhaps the most that can be taken from the 
speeches of the legislators is that they wished to allow the Federal Courts 
to develop a common law of antitrust. 119 
4.1.2. Section 2 enforcement: statutory provisions 
Numerous actions can be pursued under the aegis of § 2 Sherman Act. 
The provision is penal in nature, carrying with it the potential for a term 
of imprisonment. Such prosecutions must only be brought by the 
Government. Given the vague nature of the statute and the strict 
I IS Ibid. This paper discusses only the monopolisation aspect of the provision. The 
prohibitions against attempts to monopolize and conspiracy to monopolize are 
outside the scope of this paper. 
11 6 See the comments of Senator Edmunds: "[W]e thought we had done the right 
thing in providing ... that if one person instead of two by a combination ... did 
it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had 
combined to do it." 21 Cong Ree 3151-3152 (1890), quoted in Phillip Areeda and 
Donald F Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application, Boston, Little, Brown and Co, 1978, vol 3, 1617. 
117 See the speech of Senator Edmunds: "I suppose, therefore ... that a man who 
merely by superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because 
nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, but that it involved 
something like the use of means which made it impossible for other persons to 
engage in fair competition, like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons 
engaged in the same business." 21 Cong Ree 3151-3152 (1890), quoted in ibid. 
118 Ibid, vol l, p 14 
119 Ibid, vol 1, p 15, and ibid, vol 3, 1310 ("the Courts have implicitly understood the 
Sherman Act as a mandate to develop a common law of antitrust"). 
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requirements for finding criminal liability, prosecutions have normally 
only been commenced in "instances of outrageous conduct or undoubted 
illegality." 120 The Government can also bring actions to prevent illegal 
conduct by dominant firms and in some situations apply for divestiture 
of the dominant firm's assets. 
Private individuals can bring act10ns for treble damages under § 2 
Sherman Act. Section 4 Clayton Act 121 provides that any person 
"injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws122 ••. shall recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 123 
This provision obviously enhances the incentives for individuals to 
enforce the antitrust laws. The provision encourages private actions as a 
supplement for public enforcement, which is likely to be episodic and 
focussed on the most obvious targets. This "increases the likelihood that 
a violator will be found out, greatly enlarges his penalties, and thereby 
helps discourage illegal conduct." 124 The requirements of a successful 
private action for treble damages are (1) an antitrust violation; (2) injury 
to the plaintiff's business or property; and (3) a reasonable basis for 
assessing damages resulting from the defendant's unlawful conduct. 1
25 
However, while the policy behind the award of treble damages is easily 
appreciated, it is equally clear that, because of their punitive nature and 
the punishment they impose on a trader violating § 2, they should only 
be awarded in cases where liability is very clearly established. 126 The 
trebling of damages can lead to astronomical awards in some cases. For 
example, the District Court in Telex Corp v IBM Corp127 awarded $260 
million damages against IBM, demonstrating why § 2 litigation is 
"typically prolonged, expensive, and disruptive" .128 
120 Ibid, vol 3, 1309b 
121 15 USCA § 15 (1972). 
122 Defined in§ 1 Clayton Act (15 USCA § 11 (1972)) as including the Sherman Act. 
123 Ibid, § 15. 
124 Areeda and Turner, above, n 116, vol 1, 1311a. 
125 See Zenith Radio Corp v Hazeltine Research Inc 395 US 100 (1969). 
126 Areeda and Turner, above, n 116, vol 1, 131 la, and vol 3, 1630c. 
127 367 F Supp 258 (ND Okla, 1973) rev'd 510 F 2d 894 (10th Cir); cert dismissed, 
423 US 802 (1975). See also West Virginia v Chas Pfizer & Co 314 F Supp 710 
(SDNY, 1970), aff'd 440 F 2d 1079 (2d Cir), cert denied 404 US 871 (1971) where 
a $ lOOm settlement was reached. 
128 Glazer and Lipsky, above, n 75, p 749. See, for example, the trial in California 
Computer Products v IBM Corp 613 F 2d 727 (9th Cir, 1979). The Court of 
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4.1.3. US Courts' approach to § 2 Sherman Act 
Before the 1970s, the United States Courts were more likely to look at 
the existence of the monopoly and its purpose rather than at whether the 
conduct in question furthered efficiency. In United States v Griffith 129 the 
Supreme Court held that s 2 was breached if (1) a firm had the power to 
exclude competition, and (2) it had exercised that power or had the 
purpose of exercising it. 130 This was interpreted to mean that "it is a 
violation of Section 2 for one having effective control of the market to 
use, or plan to use, any exclusionary practice, even though it is not a 
technical restraint of trade." 131 A similar rule was stated in United States 
v Grinnell Corp. 132 Under the Grinnell rule monopolisation under § 2 
Sherman Act required (1) monopoly power; and (2) "the wilful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident." 133 The Court thus distinguished between 
the maintenance of dominance as a result of superior skill and that 
which was wilfully maintained or acquired. 
After Grinnell the Supreme Court did not hear any § 2 monopolisation 
cases until Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 134 In the 
intervening period of almost 20 years the lower Courts' approach to § 2 
underwent a subtle yet important alteration. While the lower Courts 
still ostensibly applied the Grinnell test their approach to the questions 
of the monopolist's intent and the range of conduct which a monopolist 
could undertake began to show the influence of the Chicago School of 
law and economics. 135 
Appeals records that the trial itself took 54 days, heard over three months, and 
produced transcripts and records comprising 132 volumes. 
129 334 us 100 (1948). 
130 Ibid, p 107, per Douglas J 
131 United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp 110 F Supp 295, 342 (D Mass, 1953) 
per Judge Wyzanski, affd 347 US 521 (1954) . 
132 384 us 563 (1966). 
133 Ibid, pp 570-571. 
134 472 US 585, 86 L Ed 2d 467, 105 S Ct 2847 (1985). 
135 Many authors have documented this change. See, for example, S G Corones, 
"Identifying a Misuse of Market Power in Relation to s 46 of the Trade Practices 
Act", (1989) 17 ABLR 164, 164-5. 
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Three decisions of the Courts of Appeals signalled a departure from th
e 
Grinnell rule. 136 These decisions employed tests which focussed almost 
entirely on the conduct of the dominant firm, rather than investigatin
g 
its subjective intent. These cases suggest that practices which reflec
t 
rational business decisions, even if they are undertaken with the purpos
e 
of entrenching existing dominance, will not violate § 2. They give the 
dominant firm "greater freedom to fight off its competitors with th
e 
same lawful weapons with which those competitors are assaulting it
s 
dominant position."137 
The Tenth Circuit in Telex Corp v IBM Corp
138 reversed a judgment 
against IBM on the basis that the test applied by the District Court, 
139 
which closely followed the test in Grinnell,
140 was incorrect. 141 In 
particular the Tenth Circuit held that the trial Court had omitted t
o 
consider two factors: (1) "whether or not the acts are ordinary business 
136 Telex Corp v IBM Corp above, n 127; California Computer Products Inc v I
BM Corp 
above, n 128; and Berke-y Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co above, n 47. 
137 Maher, above n 1, p 295. 
138 Above, n 127. The defendant, IBM Corp, was an acknowledged mono
polist in 
several markets for computer equipment. The plaintiffs, Telex Corp, co
mplained 
of two specific types of conduct: price reductions and the leasing of c
omputer 
equipment under fixed, long-term leases. Ibid, p 919. As to the leases, 
the trial 
Court found that adopted its policy to forestall a dramatic downturn in
 sales in 
computer equipment. The tactic of leasing equipment for long, fixed te
rms with 
penalties for early cancellation was common in the industry and IBM's 
standard 
term was less than that offered by its competitors. Ibid, p 920. The ev
idence of 
IBM's officers suggested that the leases were designed to improve the co
mpany's 
competitive. Ibid, p 921. Despite these findings, the trial Court found th
at IBM's 
monopoly position rendered its actions a violation of§ 2 Sherman Act ("
its action 
was not directed at competition in an appropriate sense but at compet
itors and 
their viability as such"). Ibid. IBM also introduced new models of equi
pment at 
lower prices. These prices were not necessarily lower than those of com
petitors 
and still enabled IBM to reap reasonable profits. Ibid, p 924. The
se price 
139 
reductions were also found to breach § 2. Ibid, p 925. 
Telex Corp v IBM Corp 367 F Supp 258 (ND Ol<la, 1975). 
140 Above, n 132. The trial Court's view of the applicable law was 
stated in its 
conclusion 6, which stated in part: 
I believe the applicable rule to be that monopolization in terms 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act involves two elements: (1) The 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market or 
submarket and (2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power with intent to monopolize, which intent need not be 
evidenced by predatory practices but which is not to be gathered 
merely from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product. 
See Telex Corp v IBM Corp, above, n 127, p 925 (citations omitted). 
141 The Court of Appeals noted that the "view of the authorities take
n by the trial 
court [was] an extremely narrow one." Ibid. 
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practices typical of those used in a competitive market", 
142 and (2) 
"whether the acts constitute the use of monopoly power".
143 The Court 
found that it was not the intent of § 2 "to prohibit the adoption of lega
l 
and ordinary marketing methods already used by others in the market
, 
or to prohibit price changes which are within the 'reasonable' range, u
p 
or down." 1H The provision clearly required that a defendant must hav
e 
"some room to move" in the face of competition.
145 If this were not so 
the competitors would be protected from "ordinary competition", an
d 
this would be "an incorrect application of applicable law" .
146 The 
discussion in Telex was quite clearly obiter, as the appeal had been
 
decided on market definition grounds.
147 It was also thought to have 
been overshadowed by Greyhound Computer Corp v IBM Corp, 
148 a more 
conventional application of the Grinnell test. However, the case received
 
more attention when it was relied upon in California Computer Product
s 
Inc v IBM Corp149 and Berkey Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co.
150 
In the California Computer Products case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed th
e 
District Court's finding that the defendant, IBM's, price reductions an
d 
design changes on its computer equipment
151 did not amount to 
monopolisation prohibited by § 2 Sherman Act.
152 In particular the 
Court of Appeals stated: 153 
The Sherman Act does not draw a distinction between 
competition on the basis of price and of performance: the two 
are inseparable parts of any competitive offering. Where the 
142 Ibid, pp 925-926. 
143 Ibid, p 926. Emphasis in original. 
144 Ibid, p 927. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 The Court of Appeals found that the trial Court had erroneously de
termined the 
correct market for the purposes of the antitrust claim. Ibid, pp 919,933. 
1-18 559 F 2d 488 (9th Cir, 1977) cert denied 434 US 1040 (1978) . See M
aher, above 
n 1, p 293 n 10. 
149 Above, n 128. 
150 Above, n 47. 
15l The facts of this case have some similarity with the facts in Telex Corp v IB
M Corp, 
above, n 127, discusses above in text accompanying notes 138 to 147. 
152 "IBM's price cuts were a part of the very competitive process the 
Sherman Act 
was designed to promote. To accept CalComp's position would be to h
old that 
IBM could not compete if competition would result in injury to its com
petitors, 
an ill-advised reversal of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the S
herman 
Act is meant to protect the competitive process, not competitors." Ibi
d, p 742 
citing Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat Inc 429 US 477, 489, 97 S Ct 690, 5
0 L 
Ed 2d 701 (1977). 
153 Ibid, p 742. 
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opportunity exists to increase market share profitably by 
offering equivalent or superior performance at a lower price, 
even a virtual monopolist may do so. 
31 
As a monopolist, IBM had the right to redesign its product to mak
e 
them more attractive to consumers either in terms of improve
d 
performance or lower costs. It was under no duty to ensure that its rival
s 
survived or expanded and there was no need for it to constrain it
s 
product development programme to facilitate the sales of riva
l 
products. 154 
In Berkey Photo Inc v Eastman Kodak Co
155 the Second Circuit was 
confronted by a virtual monopolist in the film and film processin
g 
markets who had introduced a new film and camera format. Th
e 
plaintiff, Berkey Photo, had contended Kodak was under a duty t
o 
predisclose to it and other competitors any innovations it planned t
o 
introduce. The trial Judge left this question open to the jury. The Cour
t 
of Appeals found that this constituted an error of law, as there was n
o 
duty on firms, even monopolists, to predisclose information on produc
t 
innovations to competitors. To do so would stifle innovation.
156 The 
Court stated, "Because . . . a monopolist is permitted and indee
d 
encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits, any success 
that it may achieve through 'the process of invention and innovation' 
is 
clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws." 
157 Later in the course of its 
judgment, the Court addressed in greater depth the limits on its freedom
 
of action a monopolist faces. The plaintiff alleged that Kodak had use
d 
its monopoly power in the film and camera markets to gain competitiv
e 
advantage in the photofinishing market.
158 The Court found that Kodak 
did not attempt to monopolise the photofinishing market, and therefor
e 
would not be liable under § 2 "unless it gained a competitive advantage 
in [that market] by use of the monopoly power it possessed in othe
r 
154 Ibid, p 745. 
155 Above n 47. 
l56 Ibid, pp 279-281. 
157 Ibid, p 281. 
158 This refers to film processing and photo printing at specialist labora
tories. Kodak 
had, until 1954, a virtual monopoly in the photofinishing market. Ho
wever a 
consent decree drastically altered Kodak's business practices and ope
ned the 
market to competition, with the result that its market share plummete
d. Ibid, 
p 270-271. 
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segments of the industry." 159 The Court then further defined what it 
meant by the concept of "use":160 
"[A] use of a monopoly power is an action that a firm would 
have found substantially less effective, or even 
counterproductive, if it lacked market control. Thus, the classic 
example of such use is a refusal to deal in goods or services 
needed by a competitor in a second market, eg Eastman Kodak 
Co v Southern Photo Materials Co 273 US 359, 47 S Ct 406, 71 L 
ED 684 (1927). But a firm without control of the market that 
attempts this will simply drive the purchaser to take its 
patronage elsewhere." 
The Court then elaborated a test: a dominant firm will use its market 
power if it does "anything that a smaller firm with integrated capabilities 
but no market control might not have done."
161 It justified the test on 
the basis of "a simple proposition: if an action that gains a firm a 
competitive advantage is effective because of the company's efficiency, 
prestige, and innovativeness, and not because of control over the market, 
the action is not a use of power."162 
In 1985 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to consider again § 2 
Sherman Act in Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
163 This 
case is in many respects similar to Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd. 164 The similarities between the cases are 
highlighted most clearly in the Court of Appeals' application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to the facts of Aspen Skiing. First those basic 
facts need to be set out. 
Aspen Skiing Co (Skiing Co) owned 3 of the 4 ski resorts m Aspen, 
Colorado; Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp (Highlands) owned the other. 
Between 1962 and 1977 the ski resort operators in Aspen had offered an 
"all-Aspen" skiing package, which enabled skiers to ski at whichever 
resort they chose on any day during the 6-day currency of the ticket. 
These tickets accounted for nearly 35% of the total market. The returns 
to each resort had been based on the number of skiers on the package 
frequenting each resort. 165 However, for the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 
159 Ibid, p 291. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, n 50. 
163 Above, n 134. 
164 Above, n 52. 
l65 Above, n 134, 475 US at pp 590-1, 86 L Ed 2d at p 473. 
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season, Skiing Co offered to continue with the package only if 
Highlands accepted a fixed return less than it had received in the past. 
Highlands agreed to this for the 1977-1978 season, but when Skiing Co 
offered an even lower rate of fixed return for the 1978-1978 season 
Highlands did not agree, and Skiing Co refused to consider any counter-
proposals.166 Further, when Highlands developed its own multi-area 
packages, Skiing Co refused to co-operate. This saw Highland's share of 
the market plummet by approximately 50% from 1976-1977 to 1980-
1981. The jury in the District Court found for Highlands Corp
167 and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 168 
The Tenth Circuit applied an essential facilities analysis to the facts of 
the case. 169 It applied the four-stage test formulated by the Seventh 
Circuit of the Court of Appeals: 170 
(1) The monopolist controls an essential facility; 
(2) Competitors cannot practicably duplicate the facility; 
(3) Access to the facility is denied by the monopolist; and 
(4) It is feasible to share the use of the facility. 
The Tenth Circuit first considered that the offer of multi-day, multi-
mountain tickets were an essential prerequisite to effective operation by 
the competitor in the market. By refusing to deal, Aspen Skiing could 
still offer a multi-mountain package while Highlands could not. The 
Tenth Circuit held that this was control of an essential facility.
171 This 
was the same predicament faced by Clear. It required access to Telecom's 
network to offer a comparable service to that Telecom could offer 
without co-operating with Clear. 
Second, the Tenth Circuit found that the development of a new ski area 
was very difficult due to regulatory constraints, delays, and expense.
172 
This corresponds with the difficulty and enormous expense that Clear 
166 Ibid, 475 US at pp 591-3, 86 L Ed 2d at p 473-4. 
l67 Treble damages of $7.5m were awarded plus costs and attorney's fees. Ibid, 
475 
US at p 598, 86 L Ed 2d at 478. 
168 738 F 2d 1509 (10th Cir, 1984). 
169 Ibid, aff'd, 472 US 585 (1985). The Supreme Court did not deal with the issue of 
essential facilities in its judgment. 
170 MCI Communications v AT & T Corp 708 F 2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir) cert denied 
464 us 891 (1983). 
171 Above, n 168, p 1520. 
172 Ibid. 
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would face duplicating Telecom's network, much of which was installe
d 
at public expense. 
Third, the Tenth Circuit found a refusal to deal by Skiing Co.
173 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this occurred when Skiin
g 
Co refused to deal with Highlands when it refused to provide the multi
-
area ticket with Highlands except on a basis that gave Highlands a lowe
r 
proportion of the revenue from the tickets than if the revenue wer
e 
apportioned according to the number of skiers that skied at each area. If 
a refusal to deal existed in that circumstance, then the case would b
e 
analogous to Telecom v Clear. Skiing Co would have received monopol
y 
profits, that is greater profits without improving the benefit offered t
o 
the consumer. Further, Highlands would have effectively subsidise
d 
Skiing Co's monopoly profits by foregoing revenue. Unfortunately, th
e 
Courts regarded the conduct of Skiing Co as a whole, and Skiing Co'
s 
conduct consisted of both refusing to deal except at a low fixe
d 
proportion of the ticket revenue, and refusing to co-operate wit
h 
Highland's attempts to formulate alternatives to the multi-area ticket
. 
Accordingly, then, it is not entirely clear whether the Court would hav
e 
regarded the initial refusal to deal except as a fixed percentage as 
a 
violation of § 2. However, it should be noted that the District Court
, 
after awarding Highlands $7.5 million in treble damages also granted a
n 
injunction requiring Skiing Co to co-operate in offering with Highland
s 
a multi-area ticket substantially similar to that which Skiing Co offere
d 
at another resort area. 174 It is difficult to imagine the Court would hav
e 
granted an injunction that would have allowed Skiing Co to recou
p 
monopoly profits. 
Finally, in Aspen the Tenth Circuit decided that it was feasible for Skiin
g 
Co to grant access to the facility as it had been offered successfully fo
r 
many seasons in the past and similar schemes operated at other resor
t 
areas.175 Again, there was no question in the Telecom/Clear litigatio
n 
that Telecom could offer Clear a connection to its network. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Skiing Co argued that a monopoly ha
s 
no duty to engage in joint marketing with its competitors. The Suprem
e 
173 Ibid, p 1521. 
174 Above, n 134, 472 US 598, 86 L Ed 2d 478, n 23. 
175 Above, n 168, p 1520. 
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Court agreed with this proposition, 176 but stated that the case did not 
rest on any such view. Rather, the Court held that a refusal to co-operate 
with competitors may in certain situations give rise to liability; the right 
of the trader to pick and choose with whom it trades is not 
unqualified. 177 The Supreme Court did not examine the essential 
facilities doctrine applied by the Court of Appeals.
178 Rather, it 
approached the case on the basis that Skiing Co had decided to end an 
arrangement which had developed in a competitive market, which had 
existed for many years, and which appeared to satisfy consumer demand. 
Its decision thus fundamentally changed the character of the market.
179 
This can be contrasted with the Telecom/Clear litigation, where 
Telecom's conduct could be said to ensure that the market remained the 
same and was dominanted by Telecom. 
The question for the Supreme Court was whether this conduct could be 
classified as exclusionary. The Court applied the test formulated by 
Robert Bork, namely that exclusionary or predatory conduct was 
characterised by "attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than 
efficiency" .180 This was to be discovered through the effect of the 
conduct on consumers, Highlands Corp, and Skiing Co itself. Looking 
at the effect on consumers, the Supreme Court held the evidence justified 
a jury finding that Skiing Co's refusal to enter into the all-Aspen ticket 
did not accord with consumer demand and nor did it promote consumer 
satisfaction. 181 Further, and most importantly, Skiing Co's behaviour 
suggested that normal business purposes were absent from its 
considerations, in that it appeared willing to forgo short-run business to 
apparently reduce competition by harming Aspen Highlands. This 
behaviour was not supported by any justifications based on efficiency 
and none of justifications advanced by Skiing Co had any substance.
182 
A general similarity of approach can be discerned in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Aspen Skiing and the Privy Council's opinion in the 
176 Above, n 134, 472 US at p 600, 86 L Ed 2d at 479, citing United States v Citize
ns & 
Southern National Bank 422 US 86, 116, 45 L Ed 2d 41, 95 S Ct 2099 (1975). 
177 Ibid, 472 US at p 601, 86 L Ed 2d at 479, citing Lora in journal Co v United S
tates 
342 US 143, 96 L Ed 162, 72 S Ct 181 (1951). 
178 Ibid, 472 US at p 611, 86 L Ed 2d at p 486, n 43. 
l79 Ibid, 472 US at p 603-4, 86 L Ed 2d at 481. 
180 Ibid, 472 US at p 605, 86 L Ed 2d at 482, quoting Bork, above, n 25, p 138. 
181 Ibid, 472 US at pp 605-7, 86 L Ed 2d at pp 482-4. 
182 Ibid, 472 US at pp 608-11, 86 L Ed 2d at pp 484-5. 
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Telecom/Clear litigation. Both Courts applied objective cntena to th
e 
conduct before them. They did not extensively examine the defendants
' 
intentions, purpose, or motive. Instead both Courts looked almos
t 
completely at conduct in assessing the allegedly anticompetitive act
s 
before them. The examination of Skiing Co's business justifications fo
r 
its action is also very similar to the approach adopted by McGechan J in 
the Port Nelson case. 
The most recent Supreme Court decision to consider the conduc
t 
element of § 2 Sherman Act is Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical 
Services Inc. 183 The defendant, Kodak, was a manufacturer of copiers. In 
the general product market it was not a dominant firm. However, th
e 
plaintiffs were organisations 184 that serviced Kodak equipment and
 
claimed that there existed separate markets for parts and service fo
r 
Kodak equipment. 185 They further claimed that Kodak had limited th
e 
availability of Kodak parts and had made it difficult for the ISOs to
 
compete in the market for servicing Kodak equipment.
186 The Court, 
applying Aspen Skiing, 187 held that Kodak's liability under § 2 Sherman 
Act turned on whether it presented valid business reasons for it
s 
actions.188 Kodak put forward three reasons for its behaviour, however
, 
the Court after examining them believed that there were factua
l 
questions regarding the credibility of the justifications which mad
e 
summary judgment inappropriate.
189 
Two further cases from the 7th Circuit of the US Court of Appeal ar
e 
also worth noting. In BaLL Memorial Hospital Inc v Mutual Hospital 
Insurance Co, 190 Easterbrook J discussed the purpose of the antitrust laws 
and the burden on the plaintiffs in § 2 Sherman Act litigation. He noted 
that the plaintiff faces a "stiff burden" as often exclusionary conduc
t 
183 504 US -, 119 L Ed 2d 265, 112 S Ct 2072 
184 Known as independent service organisations (ISOs). 
185 Knows as the derivative aftermarkets 
186 Above, n 183, pp 276-7. The central issue for the Court was whether as a matte
r 
of law lack of dominance in the equipment market meant there coul
d be no 
dominance in the derivative aftermarkets . Much of the decision was also t
aken up 
with the proper approach to a defendant's application for summary ju
dgment, 
that is, an application that the evidence, even regarded in the most fav
ourable 
light, does not disclose the alleged antitrust violation. 
187 Above, n 134. 
188 Above, n 183, 119 L Ed 2d at p 294. 
189 Ibid. 
190 784 F 2d 1325 (7th Cir, 1985). 
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which ultimately harms consumers is also completely cons1Stent with 
the aggressive competition that the Sherman Act fosters. 191 In response 
to a submission by the plaintiffs that § 2 required anticompetitive intent 
and that the defendant displayed this in abundance, 192 Easterbrook J held 
that intent to harm rivals is not a useful test for antitrust law.
193 
Competitors intend to harm their rivals in order to increase their sales: 
"To penalize this intent is to penalize competition". 194 Further, a 
monopolist cannot be penalised for intending to drive a hard bargain, 
195 
or for intending to compete aggressively in order to enlarge its current 
market share. 196 The only opening for an inquiry into intent is the 
question of whether the dominant firm wishes to exclude a rival on 
some basis other than efficiency. 197 Rather than focussing on intent, the 
true object of scrutiny under § 2 litigation is "the objective basis, not the 
mental state." 198 
In Olympia Equipment Leasing Co v Western Union Telegraph Co,
199 
Posner J, delivering the judgment of the Court, traced the recent history 
of antitrust enforcement. He noted that in the 1940s a monopolist had to 
exercise "special restraint" but that the view of the Courts had shifted to 
the promotion of economic efficiency through competition to 
recognising that "the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like 
everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an umbrella 
over inefficient competitors.200 'A monopolist, no less than any other 
competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete aggressively 
on the merits' "_201 There is, held Posner J, no general duty on 
monopolists to assist competitors. 202 
191 Ibid, p 1388. 
192 Ibid, p 1337, relying on United States v Aluminum Co of America 148 F 2d 416 
(2nd Cir, 1945). 
193 Ibid, pp 1338-39, citing Bany Wright Corp v !IT Grinnell Corp 724 F 2d 227 (1st 
Cir, 1983). 
194 Ibid, p 1339. 
195 Ibid, citing MC! Commimications Corp v AT&T above, n 170 .. 
196 Ibid, citing Telex Corp v IBM Corp above, n 127. 
197 Ibid, citing Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp above, n 134. 
198 Ibid. 
199 797 F 2d 370 (7th Cir, 1986). 
200 This phrase was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Telecom Corp of NZ 
Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd, above, n 52. 
201 Above, n 199, p 375, citing Foremost Pro Color Inc v Eastman Kodak Co 703 F 2d 
534, 544 (9th Cir, 1983). 
202 Ibid. 
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The major change in US jurisprudence has been a greater acceptance of 
efficiency arguments.203 The emphasis now is on greater certainty and 
predicability rather than open-ended judicial discretion. 
204 The Courts 
now look to give the monopolisr: that same freedom of action possessed 
by its smaller competitors. It may use the same lawful weapons to fight 
off their competition as they use to assault its dominance.
20s 
In terms of basic approaches the United States Courts proceed on a 
remarkably similar basis to that adopted by the New Zealand Courts, 
especially the Privy Council. The focus of the United States Courts is on 
economic efficiency. They look at whether a monopolist's conduct can 
be justified in comparison with what a firm in a competitive market is 
likely to do. They encourage monopolists to compete aggressively on the 
merits and discourage them from trading on their dominance of the 
market. A further similarity with New Zealand decisions is the 
treatment of the monopolists intent or purpose. The United States 
approach is to minimise any inquiry into intent on the basis that a 
monopolist intending to compete aggressively will also intend to exclude 
competitors from the market-that particular attitude is at the root of 
the competitive ethos. The Privy Council in Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v 
Clear Communications Ltd1°6 expressed similar views. In the somewhat 
similar case of Aspen Skiing the Supreme Court confirmed the judgments 
of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal to find for the plaintiff. 
However, the process of reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court was 
similar to that employed by the Privy Council. 
It remains now to consider the approach of European Community law. 
203 See Eleanor M Fox, "Monopolization and Dominance in the United States
 the 
European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness" (1986) 61 Notre 
Dame L Rev 981, 983 ("At a minimum, most courtS would decline to apply the 
law in ways that impair efficiency") . 
204 See Flynn, "Antitrust Jurisprudence" (1977) 125 U Pa L Rev 1182, 1184 ("Per
haps 
in response to the open-ended and uncertain evolution of antitrust policy during 
the era of the Warren Court, there has been a renewed effort to bring greater 
certainty and predicability to antitrust analysis"). See also, Kauper, "The 'Warren 
Court' and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism" (1968) 
67 Mich L Rev 325, 334-5. 
205 Maher, above, n 1, p 295. 
206 Above, n 52. 
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4.2. Article 86 Treaty of Rome (EC) 
The European Community equivalent of s 36 Commerce Act 
and § 2 
Sherman Act is art 86 Treaty of Rome. This provides: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings in a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of 
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market 
in so far as it may affect trade between member states. Such 
abuse may, in particular, consist of: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(cl) making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of such contracts. 
Article 86 sits in the midst of a series of articles which consti
tute the 
basic competition law of the Community.
207 These provisions must be 
interpreted in the context of the Treaty as a whole. One relevan
t aim of 
the Treaty is the creation of a single internal market for go
ods and 
services.208 Effective competition assists this purpose by ensur
ing that 
goods are priced the same throughout the Community. If there exist 
pockets of high prices, free competition will allow lower-priced g
oods to 
move in, thus equalising prices.20
9 Another is contained in art 3(D, which 
states that one of the activities of the Community shall 
be "the 
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common
 market 
is not distorted."210 
The Commission of the European Community has the maJor
 role in 
implementing and enforcing the competition laws and 
halting 
infringements. It also has the primary role in formulating com
petition 
207 See arts 84 to 95 EC Treaty. 
zos Art 8A, inserted by the Single European Act 1987. 
209 Christopher Bellamy and Graham D Child, Common Markee 
Law of Competition, 
3rd ed, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1987, 11-027. 
210 Art 3(Q. 
Steven Condie Dealing with Dominant Firms 40 
policy in the Community, which it does through its decisions and its 
annual Reports on Competition Policy.21 1 
The highest judicial body in the European Community is the European 
Court of Justice. It has two broad appellate roles in the competition law 
sphere. The first is to hear appeals on point of law from the Court of 
First Instance. 212 The Court of First Instance is the first appellate Court 
from decisions of the Commission. Secondly, the Court of Justice can 
issue broad rulings of abstract basic principles of Community law to be 
applied by national Courts deciding national disputes.
213 The Court of 
Justice is assisted by the Advocate-General, who acts in a similar manner 
to an amicus curiae.214 The Advocate-General summarises the positions 
of the parties and gives his own impartial ruling. The decisions of the 
Advocate-General possess a similar precedent value to those of the Court 
of Justice itself.21s 
The Commission possesses broad powers to implement and enforce the 
competition laws. It may require a firm to cease any conduct which 
infringes the Community rules and order the firm not to engage in the 
same or similar conduct in the future. 216 The Commission may also 
require firms to perform specific acts. For example in the Commercial 
Solvents217 case the Commission ordered the firm in question to begin 
resupplying is downstream competitor again within 30 days. It also 
possesses the power to monitor and control prices, and may also have 
the power to order divestiture. The existence of the latter power is 
unclear as the Commission once ordered divestiture but its decision was 
overturned on appeal and the order was never given effect.
218 There is 
also power for the Commission to impose fines for negligent or 
211 Bellamy and Child, above, n 209, 111-063, 1-066. 
212 Art 173. 
213 Art 177. 
214 Bellamy and Child, above, n 209, 11-069 
215 Ibid. 
21 6 Ibid, 1112-002, 12-004. 
217 Jstituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp v Commission 
[1974] ECR 223; [1974] 1 CMLR 309. 
218 See Continental Can [1972] CMLR Dll (Commission); and Europemballage and 
Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215 (ECJ). 
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intentional breaches of the competition laws2 19 and to impose periodic 
penalties to force compliance with the Commission's decision.22° 
There is also significant interplay between Community competition law 
and that of the member States. Member states have an obligation to 
ensure that their domestic laws do not hinder the effective functioning of 
the Community laws. 221 National laws that require firms to conduct 
themselves contrary to arts 85 and 86 also breach art 5(2) of the Treaty. 
Articles 85 and 86 may also be enforced in national Courts. Parties 
injured by an abuse of a dominant position can bring actions for 
damages. 222 
The political context surrounding the enactment of art 86 of the Treaty 
of Rome shares similarities with the political climate in New Zealand at 
the time both the Trade Practices Act 1958 and the Commerce Act 1975 
were passed. 223 European Community competition law had been 
described as evolving from a tradition favouring industrial concentration 
and trusting the power of Government regulation to limit abuses of 
market power.224 There was less belief that the actions of individual 
firms could promote the public good and preferred to further that end 
through systematic government intervention. Competition law was also 
a response to the integration required by the European Economic 
Community rather than a desire to strengthen it or to benefit 
consumers. The thrust to greater integration of the European economy 
can also be seen in the absence of merger provisions in the Treaty of 
Rome. This omission was predicated on the belief that existing trade 
barriers had prevented firms from growing to their optimum size.
225 
One point about the wording of art 86 to note immediately is the use of 
the word "abuse". Both that word and the original French term used in 
art 86, "abusive exploitation" have pejorative connotations.
226 This 
219 Art 15(2)(a) of Reg 17. Reg 17 (made on 13 February 1962) brought into effect the 
Treaty competition rules. 
220 Bellamy and Child, above, n 209, 1112-012. 
221 !NNO v ATAB [1978) 1 CMLR 283. 
222 Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984) AC 130 (HL). 
223 This is discussed above in the text accompanying notes 4 to 19. 
224 Fox, above, n 203, p 982. 
22s Ibid, p 983. 
226 Valentine Korah, "Interpretation and Application of Article 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome: Abuse of a Dominant Position Within the Common Marketn (1978) 53 
Notre Dame L Rev 768, 771. 
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suggests that art 86 would be interpreted similarly to the Australia
n 
wording "take advantage of" was, until the decision in Queensland 
Wire. 227 However, the Commission of the European Union has taken a 
generous approach to the interpretation of "abuse", taking the view tha
t 
firms can infringe art 86 even in the absence of fault.
228 The concept of 
abuse, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice, tends "to imply
 
some causal link between the dominant position and the conduc
t 
complained of, even if only in the attenuated form that the conduct i
s 
harmful only because of the actor's dominance."229 
One major difference between art 86 and the New Zealand and United
 
States provisions is the inclusion of a series of specified acts which ar
e 
deemed to violate the provision. Of particular importance for this essay
 
is the specific power to determine whether a firm is engaged in unfai
r 
pricing, 230 
The unfair pncmg prov1s1on was considered in United Brands v 
Commission. 231 There United Brands, a banana distributor was alleged to 
have charged widely-varying prices to its ripeners and wholesalers in th
e 
various countries of the Community. The European Court of Justice
, 
reversing the decision of the European Commission, found that United
 
Brands had not undertaken unfair pricing. However, the Court did
 
confirm that "charging a price which is excessive because it has no
 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied
 
[ would be J ... an abuse". 232 It then went on to propose a two-stage test: 
(1) is the difference between price and cost excessive; and (2) if so, 
"whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself o
r 
when compared to competing products."
233 
This approach can be contrasted with that of the US situation, wher
e 
there exists no residual power to prevent monopoly pricing.
234 Rather, 
the markets are relied on to prevent long run monopoly pricing as new
 
firms move into the market attracted by the high prices and high profits
. 
227 Above, n 50. 
228 See, for example, Re Gema [1971] CMLR 261. 
229 Korah, above, n 226, pp 797-98. 
230 Art 86(a). 
231 [1978] ECR 207; [1977-78] Common Mkt Rep 18429. 
232 Ibid, p 301; p 7718. 
233 Ibid, p 302; p 7718. 
234 Except, perhaps, a resort to divestiture. 
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New Zealand, like the European Community, 1s not content to leave 
control of monopoly prices and profits to the market alone. As a remedy 
for market failure, the Commerce Act contains some price control 
provisions. In contrast to the Community, however, the New Zealand 
provisions operate administratively and politically rather than judicially. 
That the Act leaves the final decision to implement price controls in the 
hands of the Minister ensures that the decision is highly political. The 
issue of whether there was an unfair price was central to the 
Telecom/Clear litigation. It appears that the European Courts have both 
the ability and the willingness to act as a regulator, something which the 
New Zealand Court do not possess the power to do. 
Other Community cases have looked at the duty of monopolists to 
supply to or deal with competitors. One of the first major refusal-to-deal 
case under art 86 was Commercial Solvents. 235 A dominant firm refused 
to supply a potential competitor with a particular raw material needed 
for the manufacture of a certain chemical when it decided to compete in 
the market for the chemical. The refusal-to-deal had the effect of 
eliminating the competitor as the dominant firm possessed a worldwide 
monopoly over the raw material. The European Court of Justice applied 
three general criteria in concluding that the dominant firm had abused 
its market dominance. These were (1) the possession of dominance; (2) 
refusal to supply; and (3) a risk of eliminating competition.236 
Interestingly, the Court did not discuss whether the dominant firm 
required the entire supply of the raw material for its own production of 
the chemical. If the dominant firm did not require the entire raw 
material supply then its refusal to deal was obviously anticompetitive 
and without business justification. If, on the other hand, it did require 
the entire supply, the Court's decision is difficult to support. A firm, 
even one which possesses absolute dominance should have the business 
freedom to vertically integrate, even if it is at the expense of potential 
competitors. They ought to be allowed to grow their business, so long as 
that growth is based on business efficiency, even if a result of that 
growth is the elimination of competitors. Rather, the Court's focus was 
on the elimination of the competitor and the preservation of the 
appearance of competition by ensuring the survival of individual firms. 
235 Above, n 217. 
236 Ibid, [1974] ECR at 251; [1974] 1 CMLR at 341. 
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The Court adopted a similar approach in the United Brands case.237 In 
that case United Brands Co, a firm dominant in the bulk banana market, 
refused to supply a particular distributor which had actively engaged in 
sales promotions for a rival brand. The Court noted that in general a 
dominant firm has a duty to continue with long-standing supply 
arrangements if the other party to the arrangement does not change its 
position. 238 However, the European Court of Justice also went further 
and considered the justification for United Brands' refusal to supply. It 
first noted that a dominant firm can protect its own interests, but that 
action can be protective only, and cannot be condoned it its actual 
purpose is the expansion of market dominance. 239 Although a dominant 
firm may launch a limited counter-attack to protect its commercial 
interests "that attack must still be proportionate to the threat taking into 
account the economic strength of the undertakings confronting each 
other."240 In this case, United Brands' approach was regarded by the 
Court's as excessive; it was more than "what might ... reasonably be 
contemplated" as an appropriate sanction against the distributor. 241 The 
Court had regard to the deterrent effect United Brands' conduct would 
have on other distributors and which amounted to a "serious 
interference" with their freedom to trade and the fact that it "could not 
be unaware" of this effect.242 
This final ground is perhaps the strongest of the reasoning put forward 
by the Court. It looks at the effect of United Brands' conduct in the 
context of its market power, and so far as it focuses on intent it looks 
only to the intent relevant to the particular conduct to be undertaken. If 
United Brands' aim was to make an example of the distributor its acts 
would only have force and effect if United Brands possessed a dominant 
position in the relevant market. Further, its conduct can arguably be 
237 United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 207; [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
238 Ibid, [1978] ECR at 292; [1978] 1 CMLR at 496. 
239 Ibid, [1978] ECR at 293; [1978] 1 CMLR at 496. 
240 Ibid. See also BBI/Boosey & Hawkes, Commission Decision No 87 /SOO/EEC OJ 
L286/36 (1987) where the Commission stated "A dominant undertaking may 
always take reasonable steps to protect its commercial interests, but such measures 
must be fair and proportional to the threat." Ibid 141. It further noted "A course 
of conduct adopted by a dominant undertaking with a view to excluding a 
competitor from the market by means other than legitimate competition on the 
merits may constitute an infringement of Article 86." Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid, [1978] ECR at 293; [1978] 1 CMLR at 497. 
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regarded as collusive. It created an understanding among the distributors 
that it would respond severely should they participate actively with 
competitors. 243 Accordingly, the deterrence aspect of the Court's 
reasoning was arguably sufficient for the Court to find abuse of a 
dominant position. However, the Court of Justice muddied matters by 
insisting on reasonable and proportionate conduct by a firm in a 
dominant position. As noted elsewhere formulations such as this make it 
very difficult for the monopolist to regulate its own conduct. What it 
considers reasonable may well be second-guessed by either the regulatory 
body that enforces the antitrust laws and by the Courts. Further, this 
formulation does not specifically target conduct which is anticompetitive 
and deleterious to consumer welfare. It promotes "cosy" competition 
rather than aggressive competition on the merits. 
There is also a principle in European Community law that a vertically 
integrated firm dominant in both markets must supply competitors in 
the downstream market at a price that enables a reasonably efficient firm 
to stay in business.244 The Commission considers that treating a 
subsidiary part of the business any differently than competitors is 
discriminatory and a violation of art 86.245 In B&I Line plc v Sealink 
Harbours Ltd and Sealink Stena Ltcfl.46 the Commission noted that a firm 
which controls an essential facility247 can infringe art 86 if it refuses to 
provide access to the facility or provides access at terms inferior to those 
granted to its own subsidiaries unless there is objective justification for 
the action. 248 Similar statements are to be found in the related case of Sea 
Containers Ltd v Sealink Harbours Ltd. 249 One significant point about 
that decision is the active role played by the Commission in brokering a 
final settlement. It played an integral part in causing the parties to reach 
243 Sees 29 Commerce Act 1986. 
244 See National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission [1975] ECR 1193; [1975] 2 CMLR 
457. 
245 John Temple Lang, "Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to 
Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities" (1994) 18 Fordham Intl L 
Rev 437, p 455. 
246 [1992] 5 CMLR 255. 
247 In that case a port. B&I Line pie occupied a berth near the harbour entrance. Each 
time a Sealink ferry went by B&I Line had to cease loading its own vessels. The 
complaint was brought when Sealink altered its schedules to improve its own 
timetables but with the additional effect of causing greater inconvenience to B&I 
Line by more frequently interrupting its loading. Ibid. 
248 Temple Lang, Above, n 245, 460. 
249 European Commission Decision No 94/19/EEC OJ L15/8 (1994). 
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a settlement by pressuring Sealink to agree to access and pncmg 
conditions which the Commission believed were reasonable and non-
discriminatory.250 Indeed the Commission in its decision went so far as 
to criticise Sealink for its conduct in the negotiation process. 25 1 
The European Community approach to such matters as refusals to 
supply or refusals to deal differs in major ways from the New Zealand 
and United States approaches. The European institutions are more 
willing to substitute their own view for those of the firm over which 
they sit in judgment. Further, they possess a greater readiness to act as a 
regulator and to set broad policy guidelines. 252 These matters indicate a 
broad gulf between the New Zealand and European Community 
attitudes to competition law. This is further emphasised by the approach 
that the Community institutions take to the promotion of competition. 
Their approach is to look more to the effects of conduct on competitors 
rather than the competitive process. They are less likely to favour 
aggressive, competitive conduct by firms possessing market dominance. 
The European institutions are also more likely to take the purpose of the 
dominant firm into account. They are likely to regard a monopolist's 
desire to increase market share as an evil to be punished. The New 
Zealand and United States approach has been neutral to such expressions 
of purpose, as long as the methods the firm employs are not objectively 
anticompetitive. For these reasons, it is submitted that New Zealand law 
has less to learn from European law than from United States law. 
5. CONCLUSION 
To return, then, to the question of the approach New Zealand law 
should take to the question of how to distinguish between a dominant 
firm's competitive conduct and its exclusionary or predatory conduct. It 
is submitted that little should turn on the monopolist's intent or 
purpose, or on the harm inflicted to competitors. All firms look to 
eliminate their competitors from the market in order to increase their 
business. Further, aggressive competition will see some injury to 
competitors and possibly even their elimination from the market. Both 
250 Temple Lang, above, n 245, p 461. 
25 1 Ibid, p 498. 
252 See, for example, "Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in 
the Telecommunications Sector" OJ C233/2 (1991). 
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intent to harm and actual harm will be found in all competitive 
situations. Accordingly, any test for anticompetitive behaviour should 
focus solely on the conduct of dominant firms which harms the 
competitive process. This will be found where the dominant firm trades 
on its market power rather than on the merits of its products, price, and 
service. For this reason, more than any other, s 36 Commerce Act 1986 
should be amended to (1) remove the requirement that the dominant 
firm act with an anticompetitive purpose; and (2) add a test for use 
which closely follows that suggested by the Privy Council in Telecom 
Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd. By these amendments the 
furtherance of both the purpose of the Act and the purpose of the 
section can be better assured. 
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